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Oskar Josef Gstrein and Darren Harvey—Written evidence 
This paper is a response to a call for evidence by the House of Lords of the Parliament of 
the United Kingdom concerning the role of national parliaments in the European Union. It 
covers mainly the formal role of national parliaments106 as well as the dialogue and scrutiny 
of EU policies by these institutions.107 All statements reflect the personal opinion of the 
authors and are not linked to their professional activities or the views of their employer. 
 
A. What is your assessment of the existing yellow card and orange card procedures? 
Are national parliaments making good use of these? 
 
1. Despite the rejection of the idea to give the member states’ parliaments a position 
within the legislative triangle of the EU108 by introducing a “red card procedure”, 
their role was heightened to a potentially large extent by the Lisbon Treaty with the 
setting up of a so called “Early Warning System” (EWS) in protocol no. 2. Although 
theoretically ground-breaking and exhibiting considerable potential to alter the 
balance of legislative power in the EU in favour of national parliaments, the results in 
practice since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 have been 
disappointing.  
2. When analysing the “Annual report of the European Commission on relations 
between the European Commission and national parliaments” 109 and the “Annual 
report on subsidiarity and proportionality”110 since 2010 the preliminary answer to 
this question must be negative. As is stated in the aforementioned documents, the 
“yellow-card” procedure has so far only been triggered once since its introduction.111 
3. Commenting on the inadequacy of the current yellow and orange card procedures, 
several general difficulties can be highlighted: 112 
i.) Incentive Problems: The reluctance of majoritarian parliaments to challenge their 
government`s position on EU affairs and the perception that there are little electoral 
benefits to be gained from engaging in EU affairs.  
ii.) Problems in the conception and vision of political measures: These manifest 
themselves in a significant number of politicians and political parties who face severe 
problems when aiming to transform their political concepts and goals onto the 
European scale. For instance, it will be clear for an MP who is a member of the 
British Labour Party what the basic pillars of his parties’ social policy are. However, 
since this policy is based on national considerations and aims for national solutions, it 
fails to integrate into a larger European context.  Additionally, the European level is 
                                            
106 As described in Points 2. b. to e. of the call 
107 As described in Point 3 of the call 
108 This triangle consists of the Council of the European Union, the European Parliament and the European Commission, 
who are the traditional players in drafting and adopting legislative acts in the European Union. 
109 European Commission, COM(2013) 565 final; COM(2012) 375 final; COM(2011) 345 final 
110 Ibid., COM(2013) 566 final; COM(2012) 373 final; COM(2011) 344 final 
111 Cf. ibid. COM (2013) 566 final, p. 6 ff. 
112 Cf. Gstrein and Zalewska, “National parliaments and their role in European integration: The EU’s democratic deficit in 
times of economic hardship and political insecurity” Bruges political research papers, (28/2013), p.12 ff.; Cooper, “A virtual 
third chamber for the European Union? National Parliaments after the Treaty of Lisbon” ARENA working paper no.7 
(2011), 10 
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the framework in which economic entities active on the UK market operate. For 
them, the internal market of the EU is the main point of reference, not the national 
economy. Hence, a gap in political action and social reality becomes visible.113 This is 
only to a small extent an issue of conflicting interests between the Union and 
individual member states. It is to a much larger extent the result of a failure to create 
modern, coherent and sound national political concepts accounting for the 
consequences of being in a single market. Such political visions will only face the 
actual challenges if - in their effect - they reach out across national horizons and offer 
solutions for the European level, the level at which these socio-economic phenomena 
are created. 
iii.) Logistical Problems: The short eight week deadline for submissions and the high 
volume of legislative proposals to scrutinize combined with the lack of effective 
mechanisms to coordinate the national parliaments’ actions as required to initiate the 
procedure. This will be discussed in more detail below. 
iv.) Weakness inherent in the subsidiarity review: The mechanism only offers an 
opportunity for “ex-ante” control. The lack of a “red card” for national parliament`s 
reasoned opinions to stop the legislative procedure  results in the existing Protocol 
no. 2 procedure being nothing more than a mere symbolic gesture by providing 
national parliaments solely with the opportunity to deliver a non-binding opinion. The 
only way to obtain effective protection against a finalized piece of EU legislation 
remains a time-consuming procedure before the ECJ.114 And even if the judges in 
Luxembourg were to support the claim that the respective act violates the principle 
of subsidiarity, this would most likely not remedy the problem since the measure 
would have already caused significant damage from the day of its enforcement. 
Furthermore, it has to be pointed out at this stage that the principle of subsidiarity’s 
legal dimension is fairly unclear since there is no comprehensive legal definition. 
Clarification of this ambiguity can only come from the ECJ as the court is the sole 
institution competent to do so under Art. 19 par. 1 TEU. 
4. According to the most recent Commission report, the total number of opinions 
received from national Parliaments in 2012 rose to 663; this represented an increase 
of 7 % as compared with 2011 (622), but a much smaller increase than in previous 
years (55 % in 2010, 60 % in 2011).115 However, of these 663 only 70 were in the 
form of reasoned opinions under the EWS in protocol no. 2.116 Worse still, in a 
European Union consisting of 27 (now 28) member states with 40 national 
parliamentary chambers (on accounts of there being a mixture of unicameral and 
bicameral national parliaments) 15 such chambers failed to provide a single reasoned 
opinion on proposed EU legislation during 2012.117 Evidently, therefore, there would 
appear to be a fundamental disconnect between national parliaments and the 
European legislative process with democratically elected representatives of member 
                                            
113 Cf. on the topic Graser, “Einmal mehr: Zur Europäisierung der Sozialpolitik“, Europarecht Beiheft 2013, 15, p. 15 – 31 
114 Cf. Art. 8 of Protocol no. 2 
115 Report from the European Commission, “Annual Report 2012 on relations between the European Commission and 
National Parliaments”, p. 4 
116 Ibid. 
117 Ibid. p. 9 
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states routinely failing to exercise their right of ensuring proposed EU legislation 
complies with the principle of subsidiarity. Moreover, the large decrease in the 
growth rate of measures taken annually by national parliaments can be interpreted as 
a realisation of the fact that their efforts in previous years have been generally 
ineffective. Linked to this lack of engagement with the current EWS is the 
aforementioned problem of logistics. It has proved exceptionally difficult to 
coordinate the various national parliaments to act in concert and achieve the voting 
thresholds required for a yellow or orange card118 and this is because each 
parliament tends to work slowly, according to its own timetable, and according to its 
own unique set of procedures.119  
5. That being said, certain networks and informal bodies for national parliaments to 
coordinate their subsidiarity related concerns do exist within the current structure 
of EU affairs and these could be utilised far more effectively. It seems evident that the 
exchange of views in bodies like COSAC and the network of national parliament 
representatives (NPRs) improve the situation and lead to a certain common 
understanding on what the subsidiarity principle means in general. However, it is also 
clear that none of the existing structures, in their current setup, are capable of 
delivering the type of effective coordination required to assist the chambers of 
national parliaments in using their Protocol 2 competences on a case by case basis 
and thus render the mechanism more effective.120  
6. That being said, the potential for effective action within the current setup was amply 
demonstrated by the exceptionally high level of inter-parliamentary dialogue and 
cooperation that preceded the first - and to date only - issuance of a yellow card to 
the EU by national parliaments.121 In this regard, from a procedural perspective at 
least, the manner in which national parliaments managed to first collectively engage 
with, and then actively oppose, the colloquially named “Monti II” regulation leads one 
to be cautiously optimistic about an increased number of yellow or orange cards in 
future. 
7. Substantively however, huge questions remain as to the precise scope to be afforded 
to national parliaments when conducting a review of proposed EU legislation`s 
compliance with the principle of subsidiarity under Protocol no. 2 and this 
constitutes a significant challenge to the proper functioning of the mechanism. 
 
B. Is there a well-developed, common understanding of subsidiarity? If not, is there a 
need to develop one? 
 
                                            
118 Craig, “The Lisbon Treaty. Law, Politics, and Treaty Reform”, New York, (2011), p. 186 
119 Cooper, “A yellow card for the striker: How national parliaments defeated EU strikes regulation” ARENA draft paper. 
Available at: www.euce.org/eusa/2013/papers/12g_cooper.pdf 
120 COSAC, for instance, schedules its meetings of the national parliaments’ European Affairs Committees twice a year. 
Looking at the eight weeks national chambers do have to gather the votes necessary in order to trigger a yellow card 
procedure, it is very unlikely COSAC will be able to assist or coordinate the parliaments in a specific case. 
121 For an overview of the communication and interaction between various national parliaments in the run up to the yellow 
card on Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right to take collective action within the context of the 
freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services (COM(2012),130) cf. Cooper, supra fn. 7!
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8. Despite being recognised in the EU treaty framework since the Maastricht Treaty in 
1993, the precise scope, content and limits to the principle of subsidiarity in EU law 
remain ambiguous. Accordingly, some have noted that it remains so far unclear what 
exactly national parliaments can refer to when claiming that the principle of 
subsidiarity has been violated under the EWS.122 As Fabbrini and Granat succinctly 
put it “What should subsidiarity review comprise? Should national parliaments review only 
the strict question whether a legislative measure should be adopted by the EU or by the 
Member States? Or should national parliaments also consider the proportionality or 
necessity of the measure, the adequacy of its legal basis and its substance?”123 
9. Some scholars take the view that national parliaments, acting under Protocol no.2, 
should limit themselves to a narrow or restrictive review of the subsidiarity of an EU 
legislative proposal and should refrain from scrutinising wider concerns of legal basis, 
proportionality and necessity.124 Others hold the opinion that the power of scrutiny 
vested in national parliaments by Protocol no. 2 should provide for a broad based 
review of subsidiarity that would include an evaluation of the principle of conferral, 
legal basis and proportionality of proposed EU legislation.125Indeed, from a legal point 
of view there are good arguments to support the view that each of these principles 
should work in combination with one another.126 
10. More problematic than the mere academic dispute, however, is that this unclear 
situation forms the basis of a lack of common understanding between the individual 
national legislators. Some, like the German Bundesrat, that represents the 
“Bundesländer” in the national parliament, are convinced that Protocol no. 2 enables 
it to review proposed legislative measures in such a broad manner that the term 
“subsidiarity” can be seen simply as a vague headline under which each and every 
aspect of an EU legislative proposal may be scrutinised.127  In contrast, other 
legislative bodies will probably be more restrictive when setting the scope for review.  
11. This confusion over the exact boundaries of national parliament`s powers of 
subsidiarity review has led to incoherent and often widely divergent practice from 
parliaments when providing reasoned opinions under Protocol no. 2. If one considers 
the single instance in which a yellow card was issued so far, it is clear to see from the 
content of various national parliament`s submissions that a general consensus on how 
to correctly approach the subsidiarity review under Protocol no. 2 is lacking.128 In 
                                            
122 Gstrein and Zalewska, p.13 
123 Fabbrini and Granat, “Yellow card, but no foul: The role of the national parliaments under the subsidiarity protocol and 
the Commission proposal for an EU regulation on the right to strike“ Common Market Law Review, 50, 2013, p. 120, see 
also on the subject Nguyen, “Die Subsidiaritätsrüge des Deutschen Bundesrates gegen den Vorschlag der EU Kommission 
für eine Datenschutz-Grundverordnung“, ZEuS - Zeitschrift für europarechtliche Studien, no. 3/2012, p. 283, 293 
124Fabbrini and Granat, p. 121 
125 Kiiver, “The early warning system for the principle of subsidiarity. Constitutional theory and empirical reality” 
(Routledge, 2012) pp.98-100; Ritzer, Ruttloff and Linhart “How to sharpen a dull sword: The principle of subsidiarity and its 
control” German Law Journal (2006), pp. 737-738 
126 Trstenjak and Beysen, Das Prinzip der Verhältnismäßigkeit in der Unionsrechtsordnung, „EuR Europarecht“, no. 3/2012, 
p. 267 
127 Cf. Nguyen, p. 283, 293 
128 See Fabrini and Granat, fn. 18 
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this case, several national parliaments challenged the legal basis,129 necessity130 and 
even the content131 of the proposed legislation rather than embarking on an analysis 
of the principle of subsidiarity. 
12. In order to improve this unsatisfactory situation, an agreement or a “common 
understanding” between the national legislators of the EU Member States is 
necessary. By defining a framework within which to conduct subsidiarity control the 
current patchwork approach would be replaced by a more coherent solution and as 
a result the position of national legislators would be dramatically improved. It is 
therefore “conditio sine qua non” to transform the procedure from its current status 
as a mere political gesture into an effective tool of political cooperation and control.   
13. Member states have to express their consent to adhere to common principles or 
standards of review within the EWS and in so doing enhance the prospects of 
parliamentary coordination and cooperation in submitting national opinions. This 
would result in an amicably agreed and politically endorsed definition of how the 
subsidiarity review under Protocol no. 2 should operate.132 Technically, the 
agreement should take the form of an international treaty or a common declaration; 
the latter being more suitable due to its less invasive character. 
14. Regarding the content of such a common understanding it seems advisable to modify 
or even commit in its entirety to the “Subsidiarity and Proportionality Assessment 
Grid”, a tool developed by the European Union’s Committee of Regions.133 This set 
of criteria does not only offer a sound basis for evaluation, it is also already being 
used by the Committee of Regions and the European Commission.134 Therefore, by 
committing to this set of criteria, national legislators would have a valuable basis upon 
which to launch their activities. Additionally, such a move would present the 
opportunity to create a circle of regional, national and supranational institutions using 
and developing the same set of criteria for subsidiarity review. Especially when 
looking at the fruitful development of the Committee of Regions “Subsidiarity 
Monitoring Network” and the evolution of its most recent initiative, the “Regional 
Parliamentary Exchange” (REGPEX),135 one submits that this is the correct manner in 
which to proceed. 
 
C. What is the future of national parliaments in the EU? 
                                            
129 Reasoned Opinion of the Finnish Eduskunta of 16th May 2012, Report of the Grand Committee, Su VM 1/2012 vp- M 
2/2012 vp (courtesy translation); Avis de subsidiarité de la chamber des représentants de Belgique, 30th May 2012, DOC 53 
2221/001; Reasoned opinion of the Portuguese Assembleia da Republica, 18th May 2012!
130 The Maltese parliament, along with the Finnish Eduskunta claimed that the proposal was not necessary to achieve goals 
of EU action in the particular policy field, see reasoned opinion of the Maltese Kamra tad-Deputati, (courtesy translation) 
paras 1-2 and Reasoned Opinion of the Finnish Eduskunta supra fn. 24 
131 According to the Portuguese Assembleia, the proposals attempts at reconciling social and economic rights within the 
context of fundamental rights conflicted with Portuguese constitutional tradition and the jurisprudence of the Portuguese 
courts, see Reasoned opinion of the Portuguese Assembleia da Republica supra fn. 24 
132 Once this “common understanding” is being applied there might be challenges from other European Institutions resulting 
in legal proceedings, but such a process might be positive in terms of fostering the development of a clear legal definition of 
the principle of subsidiarity. 
133 See www.cor.europa.eu/subsidiarity for details; Committee of Regions, Subsidiarity annual report 2012, R/CdR 
1335/2013 
134 European Commission, Report from the Commission on subsidiarity and proportionality, COM(2009) 504 final, p. 4 
135 Committee of Regions, Subsidiarity annual report 2012, R/CdR 1335/2013, p.4 ff.  !
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15. Moving to consider the prospects of this review mechanism in the future, it is 
submitted that a common understanding of the type envisaged above is likely to 
become all the more necessary in light of renewed calls for a substantial change to 
the relationship between!national parliaments and the EU legislative process. In the 
Netherlands, for example, Dutch Foreign Minister Frans Timmermans recently 
presented a letter summarising the outcome of a “subsidiarity review” carried out by 
the government. The letter unequivocally states that certain policy fields in which the 
EU currently has competence would be better left exclusively for the member states 
to deal with. Although not explicitly setting out how this is to be achieved, calls for 
some form of enhanced role for national parliaments in reviewing compliance with 
subsidiarity may be reasonably expected.136 In Britain, Foreign Secretary William 
Hague and his opposition counterpart Douglas Alexander have also expressed a 
desire to radically alter the current delineation of competences between the EU and 
national parliaments. In their view the current yellow card procedure should be 
upgraded to a red card or emergency brake procedure that would allow national 
parliaments to block such proposals.137  
16. Regardless of how these initiatives play out in the future there can be no doubt that 
increased levels of attention being paid to the relationship between the EU and 
national parliaments will necessitate a proper understanding of how the principle of 
subsidiarity is to operate in practical terms. However, this can not only refer to the 
general understanding of subsidiarity (as addressed above). In order to improve the 
actual cooperation of European legislators on drafts of the European Commission, 
the already existing networks such as the Inter-parliamentary Exchange Platform 
(IPEX)138 have to be upgraded. Once again borrowing the principle approach from 
the Committee of Regions and its Subsidiarity Monitoring Network, national 
parliaments should develop their activities further and commonly appoint a 
Rapporteur for monitoring a specific proposal of the European Commission. Through 
this, the process of subsidiarity review for a single act would become clearer and 
more easily manageable. 
17. These rapporteurs, who should be highly qualified MPs with their main duties in one 
member state, would have the function of analysing the commission’s proposal and 
gather opinions and statements of all member states’ legislative assemblies in order 
to find common ground for action. Rapporteurs should be chosen through a 
standardised procedure in a common forum, most appropriately IPEX. They should 
start their activities as early as possible in the draft legislative process since they will 
have a limited amount of time to work on the reports; especially considering the 
eight week deadline parliaments have to meet in order to provide their opinions to 
                                            
136 Euractiv, “Dutch ‘subsidiarity review’ strikes a chord with UK euro critics” Euractiv News, June 25th 2013, available at: 
http://www.euractiv.com/future-eu/dutch-subsidiarity-review-strike-news-528833  
137 London Evening Standard, “Hague urges EU red card system”, 1st June 2013, available at: 
http://www.standard.co.uk/panewsfeeds/hague-urges-eu-red-card-system-8638827.html; Douglas MP, “Britain`s future in 
Europe” speech delivered Thursday 17th January 2013 at Chatham House, London, transcript available at: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/events/view/188423 
138 http://www.ipex.eu!
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the European Union. It may be necessary to set up additional supporting mechanisms 
on the side of the European Commission. Their appointment should be in 
accordance with certain criteria such as: the importance of the specific policy area of 
the proposal for the member state where the MPs come from and maybe also the 
region the MP represents; his or her professional skills and relation to the topic; the 
general division of such tasks between the different member states in order to 
maintain a necessary balance etc. It seems appropriate to have a non-enumerative set 
of criteria as a guideline for choosing the rapporteurs, leaving the committee of 
appointment a certain margin of appreciation in order to react to special 
circumstances that might arise in individual cases. 
18. Based on their reports - which would be drafted with support from a permanent 
expert committee at IPEX, specifically set up for this procedure - national legislators 
would then decide whether or not to take action having considered the 
recommendations of the rapporteur. Depending on the political sensitivity of the 
issue, the use of an increased number of rapporteurs is certainly possible. However, 
the overall number should be limited to three rapporteurs, since more contributors 
would undermine the main objective of introducing such a mechanism: namely the 
streamlining of the process by providing a clear and highly qualified opinion on the 
topic. 
19. In summary, it has to be clearly acknowledged that legislative procedures on the EU 
level will never be “as close” to the European citizen as their national equivalents. 
More importantly, however, it is questionable if understanding the issue of 
“democratic legitimacy” in this way is appropriate, since it is not the purpose of 
European institutions to replace those already existing at the national level. Clearly, it 
is the task of European legislation to solve European problems. Nothing more and 
nothing less. Therefore, it is wrong to include national parliaments in the process of 
European legislation as such. However, what is necessary is an improved procedure 
in order to clarify the sphere for national and European legislation. It is time to 
transform the principle of subsidiarity from a political token gesture into a legally 
feasible concept. The intention of Protocol no. 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon was to 
clarify the dimension of subsidiarity – transforming it from a gambling table of politics 
into a legal principle with the power to harmonize the scope of action of legislators 
in Europe for the common good. It is time to live up to this commitment. 
 
  
